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Abstract
In this diploma thesis a theoretical model from the area of membrane com-
puting, a new emerging branch of natural computing, is used to simulate
business models. In the first part of the thesis the main characteristic fea-
tures of membrane computing, the so called P systems, shall be described.
For the use of business transactions a specific type of P systems, namely P
systems with attributes, has been introduced by Rudolf Freund, Marion Os-
wald and Thomas Schirk in [7]. These systems handle membranes and their
attributes and are able to evolve by a set of rules that compute new values
for the attributes thereby eventually also changing the membrane structure
of the system. Such systems are also used in the diploma thesis. Moreover,
a simulation tool for such P systems with attributes was developed for run-
ning randomized simulations of some specific business transaction in the way
economic studies are carried out as computer simulations in the traditional
way. As a specific example, strategies used for auctions were investigated and
simulated with the tool, for example, a Vickrey auction, a second price closed
seal bid mechanism, with bidders and a auctioneer as the players represented
by membranes. Finally, an even bigger example was modelled, i.e., a model
showing the production and selling of a company (or even several companies),
and simulated using the simulation tool for P systems with attributes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Membrane Computing
Membrane computing is a very young branch in natural computing based
on the behaviour of living cells. The main field of application takes place in
abstract computing. In [10], Gheorghe Pa˘un writes: “Membrane Computing
starts from the observation that over billion of years nature has evolved an
astonishing piece of machinery, which is both microscopic and very complex,
namely the cell, the smallest living thing we know. In the structure and the
functioning of a cell, membranes play an essential role. The cell seperates
from its environment by means of the plasma membrane and its internally
compartmentalized by means of internal membranes. The membrane comput-
ing model formalizes this fundemental feature of the living cell, namely, the
membrane structure.”
In many research papers (some of them will be introduced a little bit
later and others can be seen on the P Systems Web Page [19]) the natural
behaviour of the cells has been formalized for abstract computing. These
so-called P systems and some of their functions are introduced here shortly.
For more information you should read [11], [12], [13], [17], [2] and [9].
1.1.1 P Systems
A P system always consists of at least one but usually more membranes. The
outermost membrane is called ’skin membrane’, the innermost membranes
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are known as ’elementary membranes’. The area outside of the skin mem-
brane is the so-called ’environment’, whereas the area within every membrane
is called the ’region’ of the membrane.
This membrane structure is usually represented in a Venn diagram shown
in Figure 1.1 on Page 4.
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Figure 1.1: Venn Diagram
Another way to represent a membrane structure is to plot a tree with
the skin membrane as the root and the elementary membranes as the leaves.
The third way is to use a string of matching parantheses as shown in the
following term:
[1[2 ]2[3[4 ]4[5 ]5]3]1
Now that it is defined how P systems can be pictured, it might be interest-
ing to see how a P system is denoted mathematically. The following term
represents such a system.
Π = (O, µ, ω1, ..., ωm, R1, ..., Rm, io)
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• O is the alphabet,
• µ is the membrane structure,
• ωj is the multiset (over the alphabet O and λ the empty set)
of the region j where j = 1, ...,m
with m the degree of Π (the number of used membranes),
• Rj is the set of evolution rules in the region j where j = 1, ...,m and
• io is the output membrane.
An evolution rule is of the form u → v, where u is a string over O and
v is a string over O, the target commands {here, out} ∪ {inj | 1 ≤ j ≤
m} and, if dissolving of membranes is allowed, the symbol for dissolving δ.
Dissolving of membranes leads to a transfer of the whole contents of the
dissolved membrane into the surrounding region. Needless to say, the skin
membrane must not be dissolved.
Here is a little example for a P system that produces the sum of n and k:
Π = (O, µ, ω1, ω2, R1, R2, io),
O = {a, b, c},
µ = [1[2 ]2]1,
ω1 = a
nbk,
ω2 = λ,
R1 = {a→ (c, in2), b→ (c, in2)},
R2 = φ,
io = 2.
It should be noted that in this example there are no defined sequences for
the processing of the rules. To set up a system that selects the appliacable
multisets of rules in a specific way, we may use an order relation for the rules,
i.e., priorities. A P system using such priorities is denoted as follows:
Π = (O, µ, ω1, ..., ωm, (R1, ρ1), ..., (Rm, ρm), io)
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ρi is the order relation for the rules r1, ..., rn in the set of rules for region i.
If rule r1 should be used before rule r2 can be used, the tuple (r1, r2) is in
the set ρi. You can also write r1 > r2.
The following example is one that uses priorities and membrane dissolv-
ing. It calculates the bigger value of k and n:
Π = (O, µ, ω1, ω2, ω3, (R1, ρ1), (R2, ρ2), (R3, ρ3), io),
O = {a, b, c, d, n bigger, k bigger, equal},
µ = [1[2 ]2[3 ]3]1,
ω1 = a
nbkd,
ω2 = λ,
ω3 = λ,
R1 = {r1 : ad→ (n bigger, in3), r2 : bd→ (k bigger, in3),
r3 : d→ (equal, in3)} ,
ρ1 = {(r1, r2, r3)},
R2 = {r4 : ab→ c, r5 : d→ dδ},
ρ2 = {(r4, r5)},
R3 = φ,
ρ3 = φ,
io = 3.
As one can see, dissolution of membranes is used in this example, but dis-
solution is not the only way the membrane structure can be restructured.
As observed in nature, membranes can move into other membranes, which
biologists call phagocytosis for the living cell, or membranes can leave their
region in the outerlying region, a so called exocytosis for the living cell. A
membrane can duplicate itself with the same behaviour (rules), but new char-
acteristics (multisets), or a new membrane can be generated with a totally
new behaviour (rules) and new characteristics (multisets). To modify the
membrane structure, these biological restructuring methods can be included
in a P system. Such an extended P system is the P system with attributes
that is introduced in the next subchapter and that we will use for our work,
but there are also other P systems like P systems with symport and antiport
rules, sequential P systems, generalized P systems and many more. To gain
more insight one should read some of the papers I would especially like to
recommend: [14], [6], [1], [3], [4] and [5].
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1.1.2 P Systems with Attributes
The most economic processes are based on complex formulas, therefore a new
P system has been created by Rudolf Freund, Marion Oswald and Thomas
Schirk in [7], namely the P System with attributes (PSA). The idea is as
follows: “PSA works with attributes assigned to the membranes, yet without
any objects inside the membranes themselves. The function of the membrane
system is based on the interaction between membranes in such a way that
suitable functions allow for computing the next configuration of the system
from the attributes assigned to the membranes involved by a rule.”
A PSA is a construct
Π = ((µ0, I0) , R)
where
• µ0 is the initial membrane structure,
• I0 is the function leading to the initial attribute content of every mem-
brane in µ0, and
• R are the rules of the following forms.
1. Evolution ([a] → [a′] , f1)
The attribute vector a′ is computed by the function f1(a).
2. Joint Evolution ([a] [b] → [a′] [b′] , f1, f2)
The rule uses the functions f1(a, b) leading to a
′ and f2(a, b) leading to
b′.
3. Parent/Child Evolution ([a [b]] → [a′ [b′]] , f1, f2)
Again the rule uses the functions f1(a, b) leading to a
′ and f2(a, b)
leading to b′.
4. Deletion of the Inner Membrane ([a [b]] → [a′] , f1)
In this rule the membrane structure is changed by deleting the inner
membrane. The attribute is computed by a′ = f1(a, b).
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5. Deletion of the outer Membrane ([a [b]] → [b′] , f1)
This rule, leading to a new membrane strucure by dissolving the out-
erlying membrane, can only be performed if the membrane with the
contents a is not the skin membrane. The attribute b′ is computed by
f1(a, b).
6. Join of Two Membranes ([a] [b] → [a′] , f1)
Here two membranes fuse to form a single new membrane with the new
attribute a′ computed by the function f1(a, b).
7. Generation of a Membrane ([a] → [a′] [b′] , f1, f2)
A new membrane is created. The rule uses the functions f1(a, b) leading
to a′ and f2(a, b) leading to b′. The membrane with the attribute a must
not be the skin membrane.
8. Generation of an Inner Membrane ([a] → [a′ [b′]] , f1, f2)
A new membrane is created inside the original membrane. The func-
tions f1(a) and f2(a) compute the new attributes a
′ and b′, respectively.
9. Generation of an Outer Membrane ([a] → [b′ [a′]] , f1, f2)
Again the original membrane must not be the skin membrane and f1(a)
and f2(a) compute the new attributes a
′ and b′.
10. Phagocytosis ([a] [b] → [a′ [b′]] , f1, f2)
One membrane encloses another membrane. The functions f1(a, b) and
f2(a, b) compute the new attributes a
′ and b′.
11. Exocytosis ([a [b]] → [a′] [b′] , f1, f2)
The inner membrane is expelled by the outer membrane, which must
not be the skin membrane. The functions f1(a, b) and f2(a, b) lead to
the attributes a′ and b′, respectively.
a, a′ and b, b′ are the attributes assigned to the membranes. In this
system, labels are not needed because the functions are not assigned to a
specific type of membrane. Whether a function value can be computed or
not, only depends on the attribute(s) of the membrane(s) the rule is applied
to.
Some of the rules can be combined to construct new rules with the positive
side effect that less attributes are needed but the system gets more and more
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powerful. For example, twice using the rule 2, the joint evolution, gives the
rule:
([a] [b] [c] → [a′] [b′] [c′] , f1, f2, f3)
In [7] Rudolf Freund, Marion Oswald and Thomas Schirk point out that
the rules of the system Π are applied in a sequential way, i.e., only one rule
is applied in one derivation step to get a new configuration. We should like
to emphasize that a rule of the form (p, f1) or (p, f1, f2) can be applied if and
only if the involved membranes fulfill the hierarchical constraints given by p
and the function(s) f1(,f2) are defined for the actual values of the attributes
assigned to the membranes involved in the rule.
An additional important effect of this system is that many priorities can
be constructed within the functions, so that the attributes indicate which
rule has to be applied first. But it is also possible to use priorities like in P
systems.
Here is the preceeding example (n bigger or k bigger) defined as a PSA:
Π = ((µ0, I0) , R) ,
(µ0, I0) = [(0)[(1, n)][(2, k)]],
R = {([a [b]] → [a′] , f1)}
with
f1 : (({0})× ({1} × N)) ∪ (({0} × N)× ({2} × N))
→ ({0} × N) ∪ ({0} × {1 > 2, 2 > 1, 1 = 2}) ,
f1 (0, 1, n) = (0, n) ,
f1(0, n, 2, k) =

(0, 1 > 2) if n > k,
(0, 2 > 1) if k > n,
(0, 1 = 2) if n = k.
Every membrane has an identifier as an attribute. The two inner mem-
branes (1 and 2) also have the values n and k that shall be compared. The
only rule in this system can be computed exactly twice, the first computa-
tion leading to dissolution of membrane 1 and to saving the value n in 0.
The second computation leads to the final membrane structure by deleting
the membrane 2 and saving one of the valid symbols {1 > 2, 2 > 1, 1 = 2},
depending on n and k in 0.
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Exactly the same example can be created with a rule combination by
twice using the rule Deletion of the Inner Membrane:
Π = ((µ0, I0) , R) ,
(µ0, I0) = [(0)[(1, n)][(2, k)]],
R = {([a [b] [c]] → [a′] , f1)}
with
f1 : ({0})× ({1} × N)× ({2} × N)
→ ({0} × {1 > 2, 2 > 1, 1 = 2}) ,
f1(0, 1, n, 2, k) =

(0, 1 > 2) if n > k,
(0, 2 > 1) if k > n,
(0, 1 = 2) if n = k.
With this slight correction, the rule in this system is only applied once,
because the outer membranes can interact with both inner membranes within
the same rule. The final membrane structure and the final attribute are equal
to those in the last example by using the same values n and k. Figure 1.2
shows the computation of these systems.'
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Figure 1.2: Order relation between two numbers n and k.
1.2 Economics
In this chapter, a small insight into economics shall be given. The concepts
below are used in the examples in the later chapters and help to understand
the examples from an economical perspective. For more economic basics read
[18].
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1.2.1 Markets and Equilibrium
A market is a mechanism in economics that allows the trading of goods based
on the demand of the traded good and the supply of the good. In [18] Hal R.
Varian describes that the behaviour of the homo economicus, the economic
thinking human in markets, is based on two principles - the optimization
principle and the equilibrium principle. The optimization principle says that
humans try to gain the individually best model of consumption they can
afford. This principle seems clear. It is common-sense to buy only those
goods the individual wants to have and as cheaply as possible. Of course
there are some outliers, but they are negligible. The equilibrium principle
describes the fact that the price of a good will diversify until the demand
of the good equals the supply of the good. This is comprehensible because
the suppliers want to reach the highest profit. To reach that, the supplied
amount has to be sold, so the prices change until all goods can be sold.
Let us focus on the demand first. The demand dictates how many goods
can be sold. This depends on the price a person is just willing to pay for them.
This price is called the reserve price. Needless to say, the higher the selling
price, the less people want to buy, the lower is the demand. Conversely,
the smaller the selling price, the more people want to buy the good and the
higher is the demand. The demand curve is a confrontation of the reserve
price and the amount of bought goods.
The supply is the amount of goods the suppliers offer on the market for a
specific price. The price where the two curves intersect is called equilibrium
price. A price smaller than the equilibrium price cannot be stable because if
the demand is higher than the supply, the price tends to rise, on the other
hand a price bigger than the equilibrium price tends to fall, because the
demand is less than the supply. See also picture 1.3 from [20] (published by
Silverstar).
What happens if the reserve price decreases or increases? What happens
if the supply decreases or increases? These analyses are called comparative
statics. The answer is very easy. The curves will shift and therefore the
equilibrium and the equilibrium price changes. If the supply increases, the
supply curve will shift right and therefore the equilibrium price will decrease
and, of course, if the supply decreases, the supply curve shifts left and the
equilibrium price gets bigger. A similar change can be observed by changing
the reserve price. If the reserve price rises, the demand will rise. This
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Figure 1.3: Marketequilibrium
shifts the demand curve to the right. The decrease of the reserve price
has exactly the opposite effect. See also picture 1.4 from [20] (published by
Pawe l Zdziarski).
This leads us to the question of what the optimum of supply and reserve
price actually is? To answer the question, the notion pareto efficiency shall be
introduced here by short. In [18] Hal R. Varian describes this useful tool for
result comparision as follows: An allocation is pareto efficient if there is no
possibility that someone can be better-off without making someone worse off.
The optimal allocation of supply and demand is a pareto efficient allocation.
1.2.2 The Budget Constraint
As descibed before, consumers try to gain the individually best model of
consumption they can afford. This depends on the budget the consumer
has and, of course, on the goods and their prices. So the consumption is
naturally bound by the budget of the consumer. The first step is to analyse
this constraint for a bundle of two goods (x1, x2). The consumer is able to
consume a number of the first good x1 with the price p1 and a number of
the second good x2 with the price p2 but bound through his budget m. The
formula for this is as follows:
p1 × x1 + p2 × x2 ≤ m
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Figure 1.4: Shift of demand curve
This is called the budget constraint of the consumer. With a little assump-
tion, the examination of two goods satisfies the need for most economic
models. If the demand for a good is to be analysed, then the trick is that the
second good x2, describes all other goods the consumer could like to consume
or, put more simply, the second good is the amount of money the consumer
may like to save for other goods. This implies that the price for the second
product is 1 and the new constraint is:
p1 × x1 + x2 ≤ m
Every set of combination of goods that leads to a whole consumption of the
budget lies on the so-called budget line:
p1 × x1 + p2 × x2 = m or x2 = m
p2
− p1
p2
× x1
In a diagram with x2 on the y axis and x1 on the x axis the line delimits the
affordable combination of goods under and on the line from the not affordable
combination of goods over the budget line. As you can see, the line intersects
the vertical ordinate in the point m
p2
and the slope of the line is −p1
p2
. If the
budget increases the line shifts parallel to the right. If the price of good
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one increases, the line gets steeper but the vertical ordinate section does not
change.
1.2.3 Auctions
Auctions are mechanisms using bidding to determine a winner and how much
the winner has to pay. Every auction mechanism has a specified set of rules
to manage this. Hal R. Varian introduces four different auction types in [18].
The English auction, the Dutch auction as oral auctions and the written or
so called closed seal-bid auctions, the first price auction and Vickrey auction
(also called second price auction).
English Auctions
The English auction starts with a minimum price. The bidders raise the price
by a specified increment. The seller could set a so-called reserve price, the
lowest price the seller is willing to sell the good. If this price is not reached,
the good is not sold. So the Winner of the auction pays the bet of the second
plus the specified increment. For tie bids, a special rule must be found (for
example: in Japan, solution to this problem is that the price is shown on
a screen and is continously increased. The bidders hold buttons pressed as
long as they want to be active. The last bidder holding the button wins).
Dutch Auctions
In the Dutch auction, a specified starting price is decreased. If the price
is low enough for one bidder, the auction is over. The Winner has to pay
the price at which he stopped the auction. In most cases the auctioneer in
this auction is a so-called dutch clock, a mechanical device that gradually
decreases the starting price.
Closed Seal Bid - First Price Auctions
In this auction, the bidders do not know the bids of the others. So they
cannot react on other bids. The bid is sent to the auctioneer and the highest
one wins. The price the winner pays is exactly his bid.
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Closed Seal Bid - Second Price or Vickrey Auctions
This auction is similar to the first price auction. The only difference is, that
the winner pays the price the second bidder bids. In [18] Hal R. Varian writes
that in the Vickrey auction the bidders intend to bid exactly their estimates
of the value of the auctioned good which is very good for science because it
can be focused on the bidding mechanism itself and not on the estimate of
the bids of other bidders.
1.2.4 Organisational Structure and Management
A problem of the classical view in business problems is that, although the
problems (finding the correct price, etc.) can be theoretically solved, the re-
ality is, of course, different. In [8] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts point
out that there are other values influencing companies’ strategies. It makes a
big difference if, for example, a company has many independent departments
making their own decisions than when every single decision is made by the
head of a company. Also, the motivation of the single employee has an in-
fluence on the companies’ behaviour in a market. Nowadays it is usual for a
company to define company targets and to try to make them the targets of
every single employee. Again, there are many differences between the com-
panies in their targets and how good a company manages to make employees’
motivations coherent. Milgrom and Roberts show many such differences in
companies influencing the companies decisions.
One chapter in [8] examines the importance of information and the dif-
ferences in gathering and using it, which we want to examine a little bit
later.
1.2.5 Using PSA for Economic Models
A relatively new approach of economic problems is to focus on the single
individual and not on the whole mechanism. There exist many economic
procedures that calculate only the totality of economic processes, a good
example here is the price calculation of companies: the price setting depends
on the demands and needs of the customers and, of course, also on the price
of the material needed to produce an article; yet the demand is not usually
created by a single person, but by many customers. Many business analysts
try to find out why the homo economicus acts how he acts (e.g., see [18]). A
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big part of these economic studies is computer simulations.
We now establish a P system with attributes as a formal specification tool
for business processes. The membranes symbolize individuals, but also com-
panies and their goods etc. The interactions between customers and vendors
or companies are captured by the change of the membrane structure as well
as by the functions in the rules. The attributes assigned to the membranes
can represent not only the identity and the function of a membrane, but also
features like the colour of the hair of a person or the price of a good. Hence,
in the succeeding section we shall exhibit an example how P systems with
attributes can model specific business transactions. Moreover, we should like
to point out that we are developing a simulation tool based on the theoretical
model described in this paper for running randomized simulations of some
specific business transactions in the way economic studies are carried out as
computer simulations in the traditional way.
At this point I would like to emphasise that this work is not the first
paper that uses membrane computing for economic models. Gheorghe Pa˘un
and Radu Pa˘un provide a good picture in [15] and [16] how the fusion of
business processes and P Systems can work.
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Chapter 2
Simple Examples
In the following we try to use membrane computing with attributes for two
small examples. The system is always defined as
Π = ((µ0, I0), R)
In the examples we will only list those attributes that are needed in the
described transaction.
2.1 Buying Goods
This first small example shows how the process of buying goods could look
using a P system with attributes. The example is an extended one from
Rudolf Freund, Marion Oswald and Thomas Schirk introduced in [7].
The membranes used are five different types: The store offering goods
(e.g. chocolate) represented by good membranes, the membrane ordering the
goods called customer, that creates agents, that have to buy the good and
the skin membrane 0 that represents the closed world in this example.
2.1.1 One Agent and One Store with Chocolates
Every membrane has an attribute showing his type of membrane ((0) for the
skin membrane). The store shall have a budget called moneystore (y). The
store offers goods (in our case the chocolate) for a specified price (price).
It is possible that the store offers more than one chocolate. This is pos-
sible without changing the rules in this example if we assume that every
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chocolate in the store has the same price. So we only have to show the
case with one offered chocolate. The customer has also an attribute in-
dicating his budget moneycustomer (x) and a status with the possible val-
ues {happy, need chocolate,wait for chocolate, get chocolate}. The membrane
structure
[(0) [(store,moneystore) [(chocolate, price)]]
[(customer,moneycustomer, happy)]]
can also be seen in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Initial membrane structure.
If the status of the customer switches from happy to need chocolate he
creates an agent that shall buy the chocolate for a maximum price of p (we
use M for the set of money values we are dealing with, e.g., decimal number
representations with a fraction of two digits, up to a maximal amount max)
for him. The status change and p are computed outside of the system. The
creation can be seen in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Creation of an agent.
([c] → [c′] [a′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ({customer} ×M× {need chocolate}) →
({customer} ×M× {wait for chocolate}) ,
f2 : ({customer} ×M× {need chocolate}) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store}) ,
f1 (customer, x, need chocolate) = (customer, x− p,wait for chocolate) ,
f2 (customer, x, need chocolate) = (agent, p, chocolate, goto store) .
After the agent has been created he wants to enter the store (see also Figure
2.3):
([s] [a] → [s′ [a′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({store} ×M) ,
f2 : (({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store}) ,
f1 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) = (store, y) ,
f2 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) = (agent, p, chocolate, in store) .
The agent now buys the chocolate if the offered money (p) is enough to pay
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Figure 2.3: The agent enters the store.
the price for the chocolate. In this case his status switches from in store to
bought (see Figure 2.4).'
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Figure 2.4: The agent buys chocolate.
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([a] [b] → [a′ [b′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store})× ({chocolate} ×M)) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {bought} ×M) ,
f2 : (({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store})× ({chocolate} ×M)) →
({chocolate}) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, n1, x2, x3, x4, n2) | n1 ≥ n2}
f1 (agent, p, chocolate, in store, chocolate, price) =
(agent, p, chocolate, bought, price) ,
f2 (agent, p, chocolate, in store, chocolate, price) = (chocolate) .
In the case that the agent does not have enough money to buy the chocolate
his status switches to not enough (see also Figure 2.5).'
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Figure 2.5: The agent does not have enough money.
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([a] [b] → [a′] [b′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store})× ({chocolate} ×M)) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {not enough} ×M) ,
f2 : (({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store})× ({chocolate} ×M)) →
({chocolate}) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, n1, x2, x3, x4, n2) | n1 < n2},
f1 (agent, p, chocolate, in store, chocolate, price) =
(agent, p, chocolate, not enough) ,
f2 (agent, p, chocolate, in store, chocolate, price) = (chocolate) .
After the buying process, the agent has to leave the store. If he has bought
a good, he pays the price to the store (see Figure 2.6) or else he just leaves
(see Figure 2.7):'
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Figure 2.6: The agent pays and leaves the store.
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Figure 2.7: The agent just leaves the store.
([s [a]] → [s′] [a′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {bought} ×M) ∪
({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {not enough})) →
({store} ×M) ,
f2 : (({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {bought} ×M) ∪
({store} ×M)× ({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {not enough})) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {back bought, back not enough}) ,
f1 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, bought, price) = (store, y + price) ,
f1 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, not enough) = (store, y) ,
f2 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, bought, price) =
(agent, p− price, chocolate, back bought) ,
f2 (store, y, agent, p, chocolate, not enough) =
(agent, p, chocolate, back not enough) .
The agent now returns to the customer (he deletes himself if no chocolate
has been bought1 (see Figure 2.8), or he enters the costumer with the bought
chocolate (see Figure 2.9)).
1Like a Japanese samurai who commits ’seppuku’ (harakiri) to deminish his shame
when having disappointed his master, even though, in case of not bringing the chocolate,
this seems only comprehensible to real chocolate junkies.
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Figure 2.8: The agent returns and deletes himself.
([c] [a] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (({customer} ×M× {wait for chocolate}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {back not enough})) →
({customer} ×M× {frustrated}) ,
f1 (customer, z,wait for chocolate, agent, q, chocolate, back not enough) =
(customer, z + q, frustrated) .
([c] [a] → [c′ [a′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({customer} ×M× {wait for chocolate}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {back bought})) →
({customer} ×M× {get chocolate}) ,
f2 : (({customer} ×M× {wait for chocolate}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {back bought})) →
({agent} × {chocolate}) ,
f1 (customer, z,wait for chocolate, agent, q, chocolate, back bought) =
(customer, z + q, get chocolate) ,
f2 (customer, z,wait for chocolate, agent, q, chocolate, back bought) =
(agent, chocolate) .
Now the agent can release the chocolate (see Figure 2.10) and the customer
can consume it to be happy again (see Figure 2.11).
24
'&
$
%
(0)' $
%
(store, y + price)
 (chocolate)
'
&
$
(customer, x− price,
get chocolate)
' $
%
(agent,
chocolate)
Figure 2.9: The agent returns to the customer.
([a [b]] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : (({agent} × {chocolate})× ({chocolate})) →
({chocolate}) ,
f1 (agent, chocolate, chocolate) = (chocolate) .
([c [b]] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (({customer} ×M× {get chocolate})× ({chocolate})) →
({customer} ×M× {happy}) ,
f1 (customer, z, get chocolate, chocolate) = (customer, z, happy) .
2.1.2 One Agent and One Store with Possibly no Choco-
lates (A Closed Store)
In this case the agent would be stuck in the store. So there has to be another
possibility for the agent to leave the store. For this case the store’s s status,
a new attribute, is set from open to closed if he does not offer any chocolates
to sell anymore or for some other reason. In this status every agent in the
store is able to leave the store and switches to the status back store closed
that allows him to go back to the customer and erase himself. We only have
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Figure 2.10: The chocolate is released.
to change the following rules:
([s] [a] → [s′ [a′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({store} ×M×{open}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({store} ×M×{open}) ,
f2 : (({store} ×M×{open}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {in store}) ,
f1 (store, y, open, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) = (store, y, open) ,
f2 (store, y, open, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) =
(agent, p, chocolate, in store) .
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Figure 2.11: The customer is happy again.
([s] [a] → [s′] [a′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({store} ×M×{closed}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({store} ×M×{closed}) ,
f2 : (({store} ×M×{open})×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {goto store})) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {back store closed}) ,
f1 (store, y, closed, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) = (store, y, closed) ,
f2 (store, y, closed, agent, p, chocolate, goto store) =
(agent, p, chocolate, back store closed) .
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([s [a]] → [s′] [a′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({store} ×M×{open, closed})×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {bought} ×M)∪
({store} ×M×{open, closed})×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {not enough})) →
({store} ×M×{open, closed}) ,
f2 : (({store} ×M×{open, closed})×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {bought} ×M)∪
({store} ×M×{open, closed})×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} × {not enough})) →
({agent} ×M× {chocolate}×
{back bought, back not enough}) ,
f1 (store, y, s status, agent, p, chocolate, bought, price) =
(store, y + price, s status) ,
f1 (store, y, s status, agent, p, chocolate, not enough) =
(store, y, s status) ,
f2 (store, y, s status, agent, p, chocolate, bought, price) =
(agent, p− price, chocolate, back bought) ,
f2 (store, y, s status, agent, p, chocolate, not enough) =
(agent, p, chocolate, back not enough) .
([c] [a] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (({customer} ×M× {wait for chocolate}) ×
({agent} ×M× {chocolate} ×
{back not enough, back store closed})) →
({customer} ×M× {frustrated}) ,
f1 (customer, z,wait for chocolate, agent, q, chocolate, status) =
(customer, z + q, frustrated) .
2.2 Auctions
The auction type we want to focus on is called Vickrey auction. This auction
mechanism is a closed seal bid, which means that normally the bidders send
their bid in a closed envelope to the auctioneer before a specified deadline.
Before the auction ends, no one knows the bids (so bidders set their bid
although they have possibly been outbidden right from the beginning). After
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the deadline, the auctioneer opens all envelops and seperates out the highest
and the second highest bid and announces those values. The auction is also
called second price auction, because the price the winner has to pay is the bid
of the second highest bidder. The seller can set a starting price, a specified
amount under which the good is not auctioned. For tie bids a special rule
must be found (for example: flipping a coin or the first poststamp wins) in
our case the winner of a tie bid is the bidder whose envelope the auctioneer
opened first.
In the following simple example, we assume that all bids have been sent
and the deadline has been reached. The bidders wait in the closed world
(the skin membrane) to hear if they have won or lost the auction. The
auctioneer has to search for the highest bid and the second highest bid of
all bidders. After finding the winner, the auctioneer contacts all bidders to
announce that the auction is over and whether they have lost or won. The
winning bidder pays the price to the auctioneer within this contact (The
seller - and the transferring of the price to the seller - and the auctioned
good - and the transferring to the winner - are not modelled as they are not
essential for the example). For this example we need different bidder IDs to
identify the bidders in the rules (we use B for the set of bidder names and
bidder in the rules, where bidder ∈ B). The bidders also have the attribute
moneybidder (x) indicating his asset, the attribute bid that indicates the bid
he sent to the auctioneer (for all monetary units we use M again) and a
status. The auctioneer needs a status, too. He also saves the highest bidder
(h bidder = {none}∪B), the highest bid (h bid) (in the beginning the starting
price), and the second highest bid (price). In this example, we have to use
priorities to assure that all bids have been seen and that all bidders have
been told the result of the auction.
The starting membrane structure looks as follows (see also Figure 2.12):
[(0) [(auctioneer, check bid, none, h bid, price)]
[(bidder 1,moneybidder, bid, not seen)]]... [(bidder n,moneybidder, bid, not seen)]]
As long as the status of the auctioneer is check bid, the auctioneer has to
contact every bidder with the status not seen to collect his bid (= opening
the envelope) and to change the bidders status to seen. The status of the
auctioneer changes to announce winner if no bidder with the status not seen
exists. In the status announce winner the auctioneer contacts all bidders with
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Figure 2.12: Initial Membrane Structure.
the status seen to tell them that the auction is over and collects the price
from the winner. The status of the bidders changes to won or lost. If no
bidder with the status seen exists, the status of the auctioneer changes to
auction end.
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([a] [b] → [a′] [b′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({auctioneer} × {check bid} × h bidder ×M×M)×
(bidder ×M×M× {not seen}))∪
(({auctioneer} × {announce winner} × h bidder ×M×M)×
(bidder ×M×M× {seen})) →
({auctioneer} × {check bid} × h bidder ×M×M)∪
({auctioneer} × {announce winner} × h bidder ×M×M) ,
f2 : (({auctioneer} × {check bid} × h bidder ×M×M)×
(bidder ×M×M× {not seen}))∪
(({auctioneer} × {announce winner} × h bidder ×M×M)×
(bidder ×M×M× {seen})) →
(bidder ×M×M× {seen})∪
(bidder ×M×M× {won, lost}) ,
f1 (auctioneer, check bid, h bidder, hb, p, bidder,m, b, not seen) =
(auctioneer, check bid, bidder, b, hb) if (b > hb) ,
(auctioneer, check bid, h bidder, hb, b) if (b ≤ hb) ∧ (b > p) ,
(auctioneer, check bid, h bidder, hb, p) if (b ≤ p) ,
f1 (auctioneer, announce winner, h bidder, hb, p, bidder,m, b, seen) =
(auctioneer, announce winner, h bidder, hb, p) ,
f2 (auctioneer, check bid, h bidder, hb, p, bidder,m, b, not seen) =
(bidder,m, b, seen) ,
f2 (auctioneer, announce winner, h bidder, hb, p, bidder,m, b, seen) ={
(bidder,m− p, b,won) if (bidder = h bidder) ,
(bidder,m, b, lost) if (bidder 6= h bidder) .
The status changes in the auctioneer are modelled in the following rules.
([b] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : (bidder ×M×M× {not seen}) →
(bidder ×M×M× {not seen}) ,
f1 (bidder,m, b, not seen) = (bidder,m, b, not seen) .
>
([a] → [a′] , f1) ,
f1 : ({auctioneer} × {check bid} × h bidder ×M×M) →
({auctioneer} × {announce winner} × h bidder ×M×M) ,
f1 (auctioneer, check bid, h bidder, hb, p) =
(auctioneer, announce winner, h bidder, hb, p) .
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([b] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : (bidder ×M×M× {seen}) →
(bidder ×M×M× {seen}) ,
f1 (bidder,m, b, seen) = (bidder,m, b, seen) .
>
([a] → [a′] , f1) ,
f1 : ({auctioneer} × {announce winner} × h bidder ×M×M) →
({auctioneer} × {auction end} × h bidder ×M×M) ,
f1 (auctioneer, announce winner, h bidder, hb, p) =
(auctioneer, auction end, h bidder, hb, p) .
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Chapter 3
Creating a Model
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we create a bigger example. The idea is that companies take
part in two different markets - an auction and a concurrency market. The
company itself is defined as an individual trying to maximize its income. The
different companies can send one or more agents per period to bid on licences
in a Vickrey auction. With this licence, a company is allowed to prospect a
specified amount of raw materials for a specified number of periods. After
winning an auction, the winning bidder sends the licence to the company.
The height of the bid that the agent bids at the auction is specified by its
company. Therefore, the company has to estimate the value of the single
licence. With such a licence, a company uses a refinery to prospect the
material and to convert it into products. But whether the refinery can reach
the company’s order or not, depends on the situation at the raw material
source (e.g. the political situation at the source or how empty the source
is) which could also have a negative impact on the production costs. But
before a company can calculate the order it has to guess how many goods can
be sold on a market and which will be the profit-maximizing price on this
market. The companies use their own knowledge of the market and of the
other companies to calculate the best price and the production amount which
are then incorporated into the bid calculation. Every period, the supply of
all companies is confronted with the actual demand, which leads to a market
clearing price - the equilibrium price. How much a company can sell for
the chosen price depends on how well the company estimates the market’s
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equilibrium price.
It can be expected that if a company’s information is not perfect, which it
rarely is, this company will not be able to maximize its profit. Another point
is that it is not for certain, that a company will win an auction. Therefore,
a company sometimes would like to produce more goods than it is allowed
to. That may lead to the situation that the supply becomes less than the
demand. We also expect that a company with more information on the
market and on rival companies will be able to achieve a higher profit than
companies with less information. In addition, we think that if the market
demand increases, the companies will produce a higher supply and if the
demand decreases, the companies’ supply will decrease correspondingly.
3.2 Creating the P System
Let the number of periods, a company is allowed to prospect with a licence,
be PERIODS and the quantity of goods that is allowed to be produced with
one licence is called MAX PRODUCE (normally the licences would restrict
the quantity that is allowed to be prospected from the raw material source,
but we assume that by one entity of raw material a constant quantity of goods
can be produced). The agents that bid on a licence shall be called bidders.
If a licence is in the property of a company, we call it refinery, outside we
call it just rawmaterial. The rules should be the same for more than one
company or more than one raw material source, so only the case with one raw
material source and one company is introduced here, but there could be more
companies so we distinguish between them (we use C for the set of company
names and company in the rules, where company ∈ C). As the bidder
should be able to distinguish between the different raw material sources,
also the raw material membrane (or refinery membrane) uses a set of raw
materials/refineries) R and an attribute rawmaterial ∈ R (or refinery ∈ R).
For some management decisions like the bid or which auction the company
wants to take part in, a set of attributes is added to some membranes that
is not defined here. We call this set of attributes MR (management ratios)
and the set of different attributes A (e.g. the different raw material source
rawmaterial that is auctioned is in the auction’s MR). The initial membrane
structure has the following form (see also Figure 3.1)
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[(0) [(auction, open, auc MR) [(rawmaterial, rm MR)]]
[(company, calculate,money, goods, price, com MR)]]]
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(company,
calculate,
money, goods, price,
com MR)
Figure 3.1: Initial membrane structure.
That the auction has the status open means that bidders can enter to
bid for a licence. The raw material’s attribute rm MR especially shows the
amount of goods that can be produced with the raw material that is left in
this raw material source. As the bidders do not know this amount and cannot
correct their bids after that amount, the values in this set of attributes are
relevant for the prospecting of the raw material and if a raw material source
runs dry.
In the companies’ status calculate the sales revenue, calculated by the
market response function (returns the number of sold goods) and, depending
on the price, the available goods and the situation in the market, is added
to its money and the number of goods is decreased by the sold quantity of
goods. Furthermore, the money is decreased by fixed costs the company has
to pay every period. Then the status is changed to ”send bidder” (C gets the
new attribute bid and the price is deleted) (see Figure 3.2) or, if the company
decides to declare bankruptcy, to ”bankrupt” in the following rule (see Figure
3.3). As the set of mamagement ratios are not defined, but a change in the
values has to take place, we just show that a change of the set takes place in
the rule but not how (as in all following rules).
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([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (C× {calculate} ×M× Z×M× A) →
(C× {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A)∪
(C× {bankrupt} ×M× Z× A)
f1 (company, calculate,m, g, p, com MR) =
(company, send bidder,m + p ∗ fm res (g, p)− fixed costs,
g − fm res (g, p) , 0, com MR′)
if fbank(m + p ∗ fm res (g, p) , g − fm res (g, p) , com MR) = false,
(company, bankrupt,m + p ∗ fm res (g, p) ,
g − fm res (g, p) , com MR′)
if fbank(m + p ∗ fm res (g, p) , g − fm res (g, p) , com MR) = true.
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Figure 3.2: Changed to send bidder.
In the status send bidder the bids are calculated by following rule:
36
'&
$
%
(0)' $
%
(auction, open,
auc MR)
'
&
$
%
(rawmaterial
rm MR)
'
&
$
%
(company,
bankrupt,
money, goods,
com MR)
Figure 3.3: Changed to bankrupt.
([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (C× {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A) →
(C× {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A)∪
(C× {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A) ,
dom(f1) = {(x1, x2, n1, n2, n3, x3) | n3 = 0},
f1 (company, send bidder,m, g, b, com MR) =
(company, send bidder,m, g, fbid(m, com MR), com MR
′) ,
if fbid(m, com MR) 6= 0,
(company,wait for bidders,m, g, com MR′) ,
if fbid(m, com MR) = 0.
Every time the attribute bid is set to a value that is not zero, the company
creates a bidder with the following rule.
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([c] → [c′] [b′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (company × {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A) →
(company × {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A) ,
f2 : (company × {send bidder} ×M× Z×M× A) →
({bidder} ×M×M× {seek auction} × C× A) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, x2, n1, n2, n3, x3) | n3 6= 0},
f1 (company, calculate,m, goods, b, com MR) =
(company, calculate,m− b, goods, b, com MR′) ,
f2 (company, calculate,m, goods, b, com MR) =
(bidder, b, b, {seek auction} , company, fMRB(com MR)) .
The creation of a bidder can also be seen in Figure 3.4):'
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Figure 3.4: Creation of a bidder.
If the status has changed to wait for bidders the company only waits for
the bidders to complete their work in the auctions. First, the bidder’s status
is set to seek auction, in which the bidder enters an open auction if the com-
pany has not set a bid in that auction yet (calculated by the function fin list)
and the auction is appropiate for the bidder (and it’s company) calculated by
the function fapp (see Figure 3.5). If the bidder cannot find an appropriate
auction, he switches to no auction and returns to the company. Because a
Vickrey auction is used, the attribute vector is called v to distinguish it from
the auctioneer.
38
([v] [b] → [v′ [b′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({auction} × {open} × A) ×
({bidder} ×M×M× {seek auction} × C× A)) →
({auction} × {open} × A) ,
f2 : (({auction} × {open} × A) ×
({bidder} ×M×M× {seek auction} × C× A)) →
({bidder} ×M×M× {not seen} × C× A) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, x2, x3, x4, n1, n2, x5, x6, x7) |
fapp (x3, x7) ∧
fin list (x3, x6) = false}
f1 (auction, open, auc MR, bidder,mb, b, seek auction, company, bid MR) =
(auction, open, auc MR′) ,
f2 (auction, open, auc MR, bidder,mb, b, seek auction, company, bid MR) =
(bidder,mb, b, not seen, company, bid MR) .
>
([b] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : ({bidder} ×M×M× {seek auction} × C× A) →
({bidder} ×M×M× {no auction} × C× A) ,
f1 (bidder,mb, b, seek auction, company, bid MR) =
(bidder,mb, b, no auction, company, bid MR′) .
If the auction’s status changes to close, an auctioneer is created to analyse
the auction (now we have the initial membrane structure of the auction
example).
([v] → [v′ [a′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ({auction} × {close} × A) →
({auction} × {close} × A) ,
f2 : ({auction} × {close} × A) →
({auctioneer} × {check bid} × h bidder ×M×M) ,
f1 (auction, close, auc MR) = (auction, close, auc MR
′) ,
f2 (auction, close, auc MR) =
(auctioneer, check bid, none, 0, 0) .
As we use a Vickrey auction here we can use the same rules as in the auction
example.
After telling all bidders whether they have won or lost, the winning bidder can
39
'&
$
%
(0)' $
%
(auction, open,
auc MR)

ﬃ
ﬁ
ﬂ(rawmaterialrm MR)
'
&
$
%
(company,
send bidder,
money, goods, bid,
com MR)
'
&
$
%
(bidder,money,
bid, not seen,
company, bid MR)
Figure 3.5: The bidder enters a suitable auction.
pick up his licence. Within this rule, the raw material is renamed refinery
and gets the new attributes periods, the periods until the licence expires (set
to PERIODS), allowed quantity, the remaining quantity the company is
allowed to produce from the raw material source (set to MAX PRODUCE)
and a status (set to wait order). The bidder’s status is changed to picked up.
(see also fig. 3.6)
([b] [r] → [b′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({bidder} ×M×M× {won} × C× A)× (rawmaterial × A)) →
({bidder} ×M×M× {picked up} × C× A) ,
f2 : (({bidder} ×M×M× {won} × C× A)× (rawmaterial × A)) →
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order}) ,
f1 (bidder,mb, b,won, company, bid MR, rawmaterial, rm MR) =
(bidder,mb, b, picked up, company, bid MR′) ,
f2 (bidder,mb, b,won, company, bid MR, rawmaterial, rm MR) =
(refinery, ref MR′, PERIODS,MAX PRODUCE,wait order) .
In the auctioneer’s status auction end, the auctioneer is deleted and the
auction’s status is set to closed but only if no bidder in this auction exists
with the status won.
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Figure 3.6: The winning bidder has taken the auctioned raw material.
([b] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : ({bidder} ×M×M× {won} × C× A) →
({bidder} ×M×M× {won} × C× A) ,
f1 (bidder,mb, b,won, company, bid MR) =
(bidder,mb, b,won, company, bid MR) .
>
([v [a]] → [v′] , f1) ,
f1 : (({auction} × {close} × A)×
({auctioneer} × {auction end} × h bidder ×M×M)) →
({auction} × {closed} × A) ,
f1 (auction, close, auc MR, auctioneer, auction end, h bidder, hb, p) =
(auction, closed, auc MR′) .
In the auctions status closed the auction is deleted, but only if the raw
material source has been taken (if not, then no bidder was in the auction)
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([v [r]] → [v′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (({auction} × {closed} × A)× (rawmaterial × A)) →
({auction} × {created} × A) ,
f2 : (({auction} × {closed} × A)× (rawmaterial × A)) →
(rawmaterial × A) .
f1 (auction, close, auc MR, rawmaterial, rm MR) =
(auction, created, auc MR) ,
f2 (auction, close, auc MR, rawmaterial, rm MR) =
(rawmaterial, rm MR′) .
>
([0 [v]] → [0] , f1) ,
f1 : ((0)× ({auction} × {closed})) → (0) ,
f1 (0, auction, closed, auc MR) = (0) .
Every bidder with the status lost or no auction gives the money back to its
company and is deleted.
([b] [c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : ((company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A)×
({bidder} ×M×M× {lost, no auction} × C× A)) →
(company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A) ,
dom(f1) = {(x1, x2, n1, n2, x3, x4, n3, n4, x5, x6, x7) | x1 = x6} ,
f1 (company,wait for bidders,m, goods, b, p, com MR,
bidder,mb, b, lost, company, bid MR) =
(company,wait for bidders,m + mb, goods, com MR′) .
Every bidder with the status picked up enters the company and remits the
company the remainder.
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([b] [c] → [c′ [b′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ((company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A)×
({bidder} ×M×M× {picked up} × C× A)) →
(company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A) ,
f2 : ((company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A)×
({bidder} ×M×M× {picked up} × C× A)) →
({bidder}) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, x2, n1, n2, x3, x4, n3, n4, x5, x6, x7) | x1 = x6} ,
f1 (company,wait for bidders,m, goods, com MR,
bidder,mb, b, picked up, company, bid MR) =
(company,wait for bidders,m + mb, goods, com MR′) ,
f2 (company,wait for bidders,m, goods, com MR,
bidder,mb, b, picked up, company, bid MR) =
(bidder) .
Within the company, the bidder is deleted and the refinery is released (see
fig. 3.7).
([c [b]] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : ((company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A)× ({bidder})) →
(company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A) ,
f1 (company,wait for bidders,m, goods, com MR, bidder) =
(company,wait for bidders,m, goods, com MR′) .
So the bidders have completed their work if they do not exist anymore or
if they wait for the auctioneer to check their bid. The status of the company
changes to check order and the new order of goods is calculated if and only
if all existing bidders are in the status not seen (waiting for the auctioneer)
done by the following priority rule:
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Figure 3.7: The refinery (raw material) has been brought to the company.
([b] → [b′] , f1) ,
f1 : ({bidder} ×M×M×
{seek auction, seen,won, lost, picked up, no auction} × C× A) →
({bidder} ×M×M×
{seek auction, seen,won, lost, picked up, no auction} × C× A) ,
f1 (bidder,mb, b, status, company, bid MR) = id.
>
([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (company × {wait for bidders} ×M× Z× A) →
(company × {check order} ×M× Z× Z× A) ,
f1 (company,wait for bidders,m, goods, com MR) =
(company, check order,m, goods, ford(m, goods, com MR), com MR) .
Now, depending on the value of the attribute order, the status changes, if
the order is not zero, either to seek oldest licence, where the new attribute
periods is added as is done in the first rule, or, if the order is zero, to the
status collect order, where the attribute order is deleted as can be seen in the
second rule.
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([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (company × {check order} ×M× Z× Z× A) →
(company × {seek oldest licence} ×M× Z× Z× N× A)∪
(company × {collect order} ×M× Z× A) ,
f1 (company, check order,m, goods, o, com MR) =
(company, seek oldest licence,m, goods, o, PERIODS, com MR′)
if o 6= 0,
(company, collect order,m, goods, com MR′)
if o = 0.
In the status seek oldest licence, the company contacts every refinery in its
property to find the one with the oldest licence in the status wait order.
Having found the oldest licence, the company switches to the status set order.
This is done by the following rules.
([c [r]] → [c′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ((company × {seek oldest licence} ×M× Z× Z× N× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(company × {seek oldest licence} ×M× Z× Z× N× A) ,
f2 : ((company × {seek oldest licence} ×M× Z× Z× N× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order}) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) =
{(x1, x2, n1, n2, n3, n4, x3, x4, x5, n5, n6, x6, n7) | n4 > n5},
f1 (company, seek oldest licence,m, goods, o, cp, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) =
(company, seek oldest licence,m, goods, o, rp, com MR′) ,
f2 (company, seek oldest licence,m, goods, o, cp, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) =
(refinery, ref MR′, rp, qa,wait order) .
>
([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (company × {seek oldest licence} ×M× Z× Z× N× A) →
(company × {set order} ×M× Z× Z× N× A) ,
f1 (company, seek oldest licence,m, goods, o, rp, com MR) =
(company, set order,m, goods, o, rp, com MR′)
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In the status set order the company just contacts the refinery with the oldest
licence and sends the whole order to it, if the allowed prospecting amount
left is enough to fulfil the order. Otherwise, the company orders as much as
it is allowed and the amount not ordered yet is stored in the attribute order
again. The refinery gets the new attribute prod goods. Now the status can
be set back to check order and the attribute exp period can be deleted again.
Getting the order from the company, the refinery starts to produce goods:
The attribute prod goods is set by a function, the attribute allowed quantity
is reduced, the management ratios are modified and the status of the refinery
is changed to deliver order.
([c [r]] → [c′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ((company × {set order} ×M× Z× Z× N× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(company × {check order} ×M× Z× Z× N× A) ,
f2 : ((company × {set order} ×M× Z× Z× N× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(refinery × A× N× Z× {deliver order} × Z) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) =
{(x1, x2, n1, n2, n3, n4, x3, x4, x5, n5, n6, x6, n7) | n4 = n5},
f1 (company, set order,m, goods, o, cp, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) ={
(company, check order,m, goods, 0, rp, com MR′) if (o ≤ qa) ,
(company, check order,m, goods, o− qa, rp, com MR′) if (o > qa) ,
f2 (company, set order,m, goods, o, cp, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) =
(refinery, ref MR′, rp, qa− fpg(ref MR, o),
deliver order, fpg(ref MR, o)) if (o ≤ qa) ,
(refinery, ref MR′, rp, qa− fpg(ref MR, qa),
deliver order, fpg(ref MR, qa)) if (o > qa) .
In the status collect order, the company now contacts every refinery in their
property that has the status deliver order, collects the goods and pays the
costs of the production calculated by the function fpc. The status of the
refinery is set back to wait order and the attributes prod costs and prod goods
are deleted.
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([c [r]] → [c′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ((company × {collect order} ×M× Z× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {deliver order} × Z)) →
(company × {collect order} ×M× Z× A) ,
f2 : ((company × {collect order} ×M× Z× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {deliver order} × Z)) →
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order}) ,
f1 (company, collect order,m, goods, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa, deliver order, pg) =
(company, collect order,m− fpc(ref MR, pg), goods + pg, com MR′) ,
f2 (company, collect order,m, goods, com MR
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa, deliver order, pg) =
(refinery, ref MR′, rp, qa,wait order) .
If every refinery in the property of the company has the status wait order,
the company switches to the status expell expired.
([r] → [r′] , f1) ,
f1 : (refinery × A× N× Z×
{deliver order} ×M× Z) →
(refinery × A× N× Z× ,
{deliver order} ×M× Z)
f1 (refinery, ref MR, rp, qa, deliver order, pc, pg) = id.
>
([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (company × {collect order} ×M× Z× A) →
(company × {expell expired} ×M× Z× A) ,
f1 (company, collect order,m, goods, com MR) =
(company, expell expired,m, goods, com MR′) .
In the status expell expired, every refinery with a licence expiring the following
round, is removed from the company’s property (now it is called raw material
again). The attributes allowed quantity and periods are deleted and the
status of the raw material is set to new auction (see fig. 3.8) or run dry (if
the function fdry returns true). Having done this, the company gets the
attributes price again and the next status sell is set.
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([c [r]] → [c′] [r′] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : ((company × {expell expired} ×M× Z× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(company × {expell expired} ×M× Z× A) ,
f2 : ((company × {expell expired} ×M× Z× A)×
(refinery × A× N× Z× {wait order})) →
(rawmaterial × {new auction, run dry} × A) ,
dom(f1) = dom(f2) = {(x1, x2, n1, n2, x3, x4, x5, n3, n4, x6) | n3 = 1},
f1 (company, expell expired,m, goods, com MR,
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) =
(company, expell expired,m, goods, com MR′) ,
f2 (company, expell expired,m, goods, com MR,
refinery, ref MR, rp, qa,wait order) ={
(rawmaterial, run dry, ref MR′) if fdry(ref MR) = true,
(rawmaterial, new auction, ref MR′) if fdry(ref MR) = false.
>
([c] → [c′] , f1) ,
f1 : (company × {expell expired} ×M× Z× A) →
(company × {sell} ×M× Z×M× A) ,
f1 (company, expell expired,m, g, com MR) =
(company, sell,m, g, fprice(m, g, com MR), com MR
′) .
If the raw material has the status new auction, a new auction (with new
management ratios produced by the function fMRA (rm MR)) is created
around the raw material. The attribute status of the raw material is deleted
(see fig. 3.9).
([r] → [v′ [r′]] , f1, f2) ,
f1 : (rawmaterial × {new auction} × A) →
(rawmaterial × A) ,
f2 : (rawmaterial × {new auction} × A) →
({auction} × {created} × A) ,
f1 (rawmaterial, new auction, rm MR) = (rawmaterial, rm MR
′) ,
f2 (rawmaterial, new auction, rm MR) = (auction, created, fMRA (rawmaterial MR)) .
If all companies have the status sell or bankrupt and all auctions have the
status open or created and no raw material has the status new auction, a new
48
'&
$
%
(0)
'
&
$
%
(rawmaterial,
new auction,
ref MR)
'
&
$
%
(company,
expell expired,
money, goods,
com MR)
Figure 3.8: The refineries with expired licences have been expelled from the
company.
period begins. The status of every company in the status sell changes to
calculate, the refineries periods are decreased by one and every auction with
the status created gets the new status open and every auction with the status
open gets the new status close.
To keep the model general, many attributes are set from outside and many
functions are not defined in the model. These functions are implemented in
the simulation considering economic decisions and rules given by the market
and introduced in the next chapter.
49
'&
$
%
(0)' $
%
(auction, open,
auc MR)
'
&
$
%
(rawmaterial
rm MR)
'
&
$
%
(company,
sell,
money, goods, price,
com MR)
Figure 3.9: A new auction has been created.
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Chapter 4
Simulating the Model
4.1 Artificial Intelligence (Economic Decisions)
In this section the decisions of the different companies and the market re-
sponse (all not yet defined functions) used in the computer simulation shall
be introduced. As this shall be an economic simulation, the decisions are
based on economic facts.
A market calculation using the companies’ information of the mar-
ket
As described in [8], the information a company has is important for decisions
like setting of a price and estimating the correct supply. Here is a quick ex-
ample: The market can be calculated involving the companies’ information.
Analyzing a market is a very interesting part of economics and depends on
many market characteristics. How a company takes part at the market, is the
main factor for price setting or other important decisions a company has to
make. In this example, we will simulate a competitive market. So the single
company has not much influence on the price in the market equilibrium, but
the companies have imperfect information about this price, so the companies
just can guess the price in the market equilibrium.
Let the demand of the market be
Dt = Dt−1 + ut
where ut is the change in the demand for every period (normally distributed
random value N(0, σ2)).
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Let the supply of a single company be
Sit = ai + bi ∗ Pit if Pit > 0 | ai > 0, bi > 0
0 else
and
Pit = βi ∗ Pt + (1− βi) ∗ Pt−1 | 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1
where the variable βi indicates the amount of information of the other com-
panies and the market a company has.
The change of the equilibrium price is
Pt − Pt−1 = ∆Pt = α ∗ (Dt − St) | α > 0
By solving these equations (with perfect information) the equilibrium
price is
Pt =
α ∗Dt − α ∗
∑
ai
1 + α ∗∑(bi ∗ βi) + 1− α ∗
∑
(bi ∗ (1− βi))
1 + α ∗∑(bi ∗ βi) ∗ Pt−1
These equations are used in the needed functions for our model. If a com-
pany cannot reach its supply function, the values ai and bi will be corrected
in the specific period.
How a company calculates the price for the produced goods
Because we have calculated the price a company will choose in the market
analysis, the price can be taken from the analysis:
fprice (money, goods, com MR) = Pit if Pit > 0
0 else
How a company calculates the order of goods
The order depends on the calculated supply of the company (Sit), the differ-
ence between the last period (Oit−1) of the ordered goods, the reached supply
(S∗it−1= last periods of produced goods fpg) (the company tries to order more
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goods to reach the needed supply) and obviously the goods the company has
on stock.
ford (money, goods, com MR) = Sit + γi ∗ (Oit−1 − S∗it−1)− goods
where γi shows how the company reacts on the difference.
How many goods can be sold on the market by one company
We assume that the buyers in our market have perfect information on all
sellers (and all goods are exactly the same), hence every buyer will buy the
cheapest good available on the market. Therefore, the result of the market
(sold goods) depends on the demand of the market and the prices and supplies
of the other companies.
fm res (goods, price) =
{
goods if r ≥ goods
r else
where r is the remainder of the market demand, if all cheaper companies
have sold their goods, divided up equally amongst the companies at the
same price.
How a company calculates its bids
As we know, in the Vickrey auction the bidders intend to bid exactly their
estimates of the asset of the auctioned good. So we have to focus on the
problem: how much the company X is willing to pay for a new raw material
source.
To solve this problem, the company checks how many goods can be sold
in a period for which price, which markup and which production costs and
how many goods is the company able to deliver over the next periods.
The height of the bid is then simple to calculate:
fbid (money, com MR) =
bid = (Pit − productioncosts−markup) ∗∑
(|goodsdemandedi − goods2deliveri|)
if money − securitystock ≥ (bid + productioncosts) ,
money − productioncosts else.
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The productioncosts shall be the average costs of the productions.
The markup is a constant value per company in this example.
The value goodsdemandedi is the number of goods demanded from the
marked in following periods. In this example, the company assumes that in
the next periods the same amount as in the actual period is demanded.
The value goods2deliveri is the number of goods the company can pro-
duce in the following periods. This amount depends on the licences in the
companies property (delivery amount and expiration period).
How a company decides to go bankrupt
The company goes bankrupt if the money of the company decreases to a
value below a specified limit LIM BANKRUPCY .
fbank (money, goods, com MR) ={
true if (money + goods ∗ Pit) < LIM BANKRUPCY
false else
How a bidder checks if an auction is appropriate for a bidder’s
company
This shall depend on three variables: c risk is the risk a company is willing
to take, the common parameter c including all common properties of the raw
material source (e.g., the political situation near the raw material source)
calculated by a normally distributed random value and β that indicates the
amount of information of c the company has.
fapp (bid MR, auc MR) =
{
true if (β ∗ ct + (1− β) ∗ ct−1) > −c risk
false else
How a refinery/company calculates the produced goods and the
costs of production
Calculating the produced goods:
How much a refinery can produce depends on the total amount left in the
source (total) part of ref MR a global limit (LIM FIND)(if the relation
between goodsToProduce and total lies under the limit it is harder to find
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raw materials in the source (e.g., 0,5), a common parameter (c) and the
amount the company orders (goodsToProduce).
First, a function calculates if the company produces on the limit.
flim (goodsToProduce, total) =
{
0 if goodsToProduce
total
< LIM FIND
goodsToProduce
total
else
A further function checks how much the refinery could have produced.
fx (ref MR, goodsToProduce) = goodsToProduce ∗
(1− α ∗ flim (goodsToProduce, total)
+β ∗ ct)
and the function fpg:
fpg (ref MR, goodsToProduce) =

fx (ref MR, goodsToProduce)
if fx < goodsToProduce
goodsToProduce else
Calculating the costs of the production:
this shall depend on standard costs per entity (sc), a common parameter c
and the produced goods.
fpc(ref MR,ProducedGoods) = ProducedGoods ∗ (sc ∗ (1− α ∗ ct))
Other functions
Check-up if a raw material source has run dry:
A simple comparison of the total amount in the raw material source and the
amount allowed to produce in the licence.
fdry (ref MR) =
{
true if total < MAX PRODUCE
false else
Check-up if the company already takes part at the auction:
Part of the auc MR is a list of companies of the bidders taking place in the
auction. So for every entering bidder his company is added to the auction
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list. The function fin list just checks if the company of the entering bidder is
in the list, this is done by the newly created operator IN :
fin list (auc MR, company) =
{
true if company IN auc MR
false else
Creating management ratios:
The function fMRB(com MR) and fMRA (rm MR) just “copy” variables
from the com MR or the rm MR.
4.2 Implementation of the Simulation
Techniques used and construction of the model
On first sight, the PSA seems to have a few things in common with object-
oriented programming, like the membrane as single object proceeding a rule
(method) by modifying own or other attributes, hence this technique was
used to build the simulation. We have chosen Java to implement the simula-
tion because it is an object-oriented language and it can be applied to many
different class libraries.
For finding random numbers, we have chosen the class java.util.Random, a
class that generates a stream of pseudo-random numbers by using a 48 bit
seed. To avoid the same random numbers by taking the same seed, we used
an instance of this class with the current timestamp as seed to generate the
different needed seeds of all other random instances. By the use of this con-
struction it can be secured that the instances of the random class tend to
generate different random numbers.
To compare the different price-goods set of every company on the market,
the interface java.lang.Comparable was used to implement the comparison.
The membranes were built by a class implementing a thread that tries to
compute the different rules. Every specific membrane (like companies, raw
material, bidder,...) inherits from that membrane class to use the thread but
has its own set of rules.
To plot the output of the simulation, some csv Files (comma seperated val-
ues) are generated that can be easily followed up in KSpread (Linux) or Excel
(Windows, Mac) and can be seen in the appendix.
It is also possible to change a few settings that shall be introduced here
simply:
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• Common Parameters
– MODEL RUNS
number of runs that will be produced per one execution of the
program
– RUN PERIODS
periods per run
– MAX LICENCE PERIODS
number of periods a company can produce with one licence
– MAX LICENCE PRODUCE
number of goods a company is allowed to produce with one licence
– FIXED COSTS
costs that every company has to pay per period
– STANDARDPRODCOSTS
production costs per product
– MIN AUC PRICE
reserve price per auction
• Market parameters
– startdemand
the demand in the first period
– sigma
the variance parameter of the random term in the demand calcu-
lation
– alpha
the influence of the difference between demand and supply on the
equilibrium price calculation
– initPrice
the equilibrium price in the first period
• Company parameters
– money
the starting asset of a company
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– limit bankruptcy
if the company’s asset is below this amount, the company decides
to declare bankrupcy
– startinggoods
the number of goods the company has in the first period
– last production costs
production costs of the last period
– startingprice
the price the company sells the goods on the market in the first
period
– a
parameter a of the supply function
– b
parameter b of the supply function
– beta
parameter beta of the supply function
– gamma
parameter gamma for calculating the order
– markup
markup per entity in %
– risk f app
risk for bidding for a raw material
– minPrice
min Price to play on market
– safetymarkup
safety markup for calculating the bid, the company keeps always
safetymarkup* limit bankruptcy
• Raw material parameters
– total
amount of goods in the raw material source
– inflCommonOnCosts
the influence of the common parameters on the costs
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– inflCommonOnProd
the influence of the common parameters on the production
– limFind
percent of the total amount below which the company will find
less goods than ordered
– inflUnderLimit
influence on the amount of goods, that are found in the source, if
the total amount is below limFind
– commonStart
initial common parameters of the raw material source
– center
center of the gaussian curve for calculating the next common pa-
rameter
– sigma
the variance parameter of the Gaussian curve for calculating the
next common parameter
Using the tool
We created three use cases for testing the tool. In all three cases we did
50 runs per 100 periods with a set of adjustment values. By changing these
adjustment values marginally, we tried to find tendencies how a specific value
has an impact on the whole system. We created three different companies
and 20 raw material sources for every case.
In the first case, we assume that all three companies have perfect information
on how the market evolves and how the different players act on this market.
In a second case, one company is the information leader and the other two
companies are geared to the last periods’ price. In the third case, we assume
that at the raw material sources the circumstances tend to get worse, so that
it gets harder to produce at the specific source. A company in this case will
take more risks than the other companies. So it also tries to auction raw
material sources, where the other companies keep their hands off.
Perfect Information
In this case, every company and every raw material source has the same
settings. Therefore it is of no big surprise that the results of the different
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runs are nearly equal. As expected, there are no big differences in supply
and demand or the expected and the equilibrium price as can be seen in the
two graphs 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.1: supply and demand
It was interesting that a lower minimal auction price was relevant for the
impact of the coincidence auctioning a raw material source. The more the
minimal auction price fits to the calculated price of the companies, the less
impact the choice has on which raw material source a company auctions. It
was relevant for a stable market to adjust the market in a way that the price
and the demand do not fluctuate so much. Some mavericks at the normally
equal expected and equilibrium price can be avowed by the fact that the
companies, if they do not have enough capacities to produce, their supply
function is slightly modified (see the graphs in Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
So in this case, the companies cannot guess the actions of the other com-
panies perfectly and the overall supply will not reach or exceed the demand.
Because the last periods price has an affect on the price calculation, this
shock also influences the next period. This would not happen with a consis-
tent adapting supply function of the companies. But, aside of these excep-
tions, the results are very balanced. The companies often have similar assets
at the end of a run, they nearly gain the same returns and satisfy the same
demand. The result can also be seen graphically in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
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Figure 4.2: expected price and equilibrium price
The information leader
The difference between this case and the last one is that only one company
has perfect information and the others use the strategy to conform to the
last period. Here we have to point out that perfect information is not always
an advantage. The point is that the two other companies will rather use
the equilibrium price of the last period to calculate the new supply. In case
the equilibrium price of the last period is higher than the newly expected
price with perfect information, the companies will produce more than they
should. The company with perfect information knows that and produces the
appropriate amount to reach the actual demand. With a more aggressive
strategy the company could use its informational advantage to harm the
other companies by producing more and selling it at a lower price. In any
case, more information tends to produce more wins, as we expected before.
This can be seen in the graph of Figure 4.8.
Raw material crisis with a risk-taking company
In this case we induced the random walk, calculating the circumstances at
the raw material source to produce more negative values than positive ones.
So this variable tends to get worse for every source. Now we can set the bad
impact of the common parameter. The higher the bad influence on produc-
tion price and production amount is, the less competitive a riskier company
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Figure 4.3: supply and demand with shock
will be on the market, but within specific borders such a company can press
home on advantage. Now we let one of the companies take more risk, so
that on the one hand it will find more auctions that are appropriate, but on
the other hand, the production will be less save and more expensive. If the
company just bids on bad raw material sources without trying to compensate
for the disadvantages, the company tends not to be as competitive as can be
seen in Figure 4.9 although the turnover is nearly the same (see Figure 4.10)
but the number of goods sold is much less (see Figure 4.11).
To counteract the uncertainty producing all goods that are ordered, the
company orders more goods than calculated. This may be more expensive to
produce, but the company can reach its calculated supply. As this company
bids on the bad sources, it usually will get it for a lower price (because there
are no other bidders), see Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14.
Ideas to enlarge the simulation
As mentioned before, this simulation can be extended in many ways. This
paragraph shall give some ideas as to what could be done. So I want to
highlight some ideas from the automatic adjustment of the minimal auction
price to the evolving supply function, considering the production capacities
of the company or aggressive strategies (e.g., sell more but cheaper, or bid
more on more sources to buy all production capacities although they are not
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Figure 4.4: expected price and equilibrium price with a shock
needed). Another reaction function of the market: The market should react
on prices over or under the equilibrium price. This could be implemented
by using a new value that gives the factor how much the company sells with
a price different from the equilibrium price. Companies that sell at a too
expensive price will not sell all their goods. To create a disadvantage for this
companies, stock costs shall be introduced.
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Figure 4.5: winning companies with perfect information
Figure 4.6: turnover per product with perfect information
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Figure 4.7: satisfied demand with perfect information
Figure 4.8: winning companies with an infoleader C1
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Figure 4.9: winning companies in a raw material crisis and a risk taking
bidder (C1).
Figure 4.10: turnover per product in a raw material crisis and a risk taking
bidder (C1).
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Figure 4.11: satisfied demand in a raw material crisis and a risk taking bidder
(C1).
Figure 4.12: winning companies in a raw material crisis and a risk taking
bidder that compensates production bottlenecks (C1).
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Figure 4.13: turnover per product in a raw material crisis and a risk taking
bidder that compensates production bottlenecks (C1).
Figure 4.14: satisfied demand in a raw material crisis and a risk taking bidder
that compensates production bottlenecks (C1).
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
In this diploma thesis we introduced a new P system, namely the P systems
with attributes or PSA for short. With these P systems we demonstrate how
to create business transactions. In the created examples it can be seen that
a PSA can be used to investigate the economic behaviour of an individual
but also to create systems that calculate the totality of an economic process.
To investigate the individual’s characteristics is, of course, the more interest-
ing way and to create models that calculate the whole business transaction
without the individual view there are many other techniques. So the focus
in the introduced examples lies on the individual. In a PSA it is possible to
use functions that compute economic terms. These terms are considered as
endogenous, so we can keep the model simple and can use proven economic
formulas. Because of the openess of the system, it is easy to extend or modify
it. Every behaviour can be created with one or a few rules, so a PSA can be
created with a modular concept. Keeping the modularity may be a bit com-
plex in the implementation, but this is not always necessary. We used the
tool we implemented to inspect three economical use cases that investigate
information on companies and crises in productions. It has been shown that
some economic circumstances can be reconstructed with the tool, for some
others the tool has to be extented.
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Appendix A
CVS Files - Output of the
simulation
Figure A.1: result of the market per run
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Figure A.2: result of a company per run
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Figure A.3: first part of overall result - all periods and 50 runs.
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Figure A.4: second part of overall result - all periods and 50 runs.
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Appendix B
Abstract
B.1 in English
In this diploma thesis a theoretical model from the area of membrane com-
puting, a new emerging branch of natural computing, is used to simulate
business models. In the first part of the thesis the main characteristic fea-
tures of membrane computing, the so called P systems, shall be described.
For the use of business transactions a specific type of P systems, namely P
systems with attributes, has been introduced by Rudolf Freund, Marion Os-
wald and Thomas Schirk in [7]. These systems handle membranes and their
attributes and are able to evolve by a set of rules that compute new values
for the attributes thereby eventually also changing the membrane structure
of the system. Such systems are also used in the diploma thesis. Moreover,
a simulation tool for such P systems with attributes was developed for run-
ning randomized simulations of some specific business transaction in the way
economic studies are carried out as computer simulations in the traditional
way. As a specific example, strategies used for auctions were investigated and
simulated with the tool, for example, a Vickrey auction, a second price closed
seal bid mechanism, with bidders and a auctioneer as the players represented
by membranes. Finally, an even bigger example was modelled, i.e., a model
showing the production and selling of a company (or even several companies),
and simulated using the simulation tool for P systems with attributes.
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B.2 in German
In dieser Diplomarbeit wird mittels eines theorethischen Models aus einem
neu entstehenden Bereichs des “Natural Computings”ein wirtschaftliches Model
simuliert. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit soll das sogenannte P-System mit seinen
wesentlichen Eigenschaften vorgestellt werden. Fu¨r den Zweck von wirtschaftlichen
Transaktionen wurde ein eigenes P-System entwickelt: Das P-System mit
Attributen, welches bereits von Rudolf Freund, Marion Oswald und Thomas
Schirk in [7] vero¨ffentlicht wurde. Solche P-Systeme verwenden Membra-
nen, deren Attribute und einen Satz von Regeln, die die Werte der Attribute
oder sogar die Struktur der Membranen innerhalb des Systems vera¨ndern
kann. Solche P-Systeme werden in dieser Arbeit verwendet. Daru¨ber hin-
aus wird ein Simulationstool entwicklt, mit welchem man zufallsgesteuerte
Simulationen fu¨r bestimmte Wirtschaftstransaktionen durchfu¨hren kann, so
wie es bei wirtschaftlichen Studien mit herko¨mmlichen Computersimulatio-
nen u¨blich ist. Beispielsweise werden Strategien fu¨r Auktionen untersucht
und mit dem Tool simuliert werden, zum Beipiel die Vickrey Auktion, eine
Zweitpreisauktion mit versiegelten Geboten. Die Spieler - Bieter und der
Auktiona¨r - werden hierbei von den Membranen dargestellt. Abschließend
wird ein gro¨ßeres Modell erstellt, das Produktion und Verkauf von einem
(oder mehreren) Unternehmen abbildet. Dieses Modell wird dann mit dem
erstellten Simulationstool fu¨r P-Systeme mit Attributen simuliert.
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